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Hauser: The 2009 Amendment to Federal Rule 15(a)(1) - A Study in Ambiguit

THE 2009 AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL RULE 15(a)(1) A STUDY IN AMBIGUITY
SUSAN

E. HAUSER*

"Procedure is a means to an end, not an end in itself; and, often necessarily, its rules must be applied to do justice in the particular case,
whatever the doubts raised as to the future.
Since even rule-making can never be wholly successful, we must spend
our time trying to catch up with the mistakes and patch up the
structure!"'

Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1937,2
Rule 15(a)(1) has allowed pleadings to be amended one time, as a
matter of course, within a set and limited period of time.' Rule
15(a)(1) was amended on December 1, 2009 to change the time limits
for these as of course amendments.' The 2009 amendment was on the
horizon for many years, and its drafters made every effort to clearly
explain its purpose and their intentions. Despite this, however, the
amendment was drafted in a way that creates an ambiguous result
when thoughtfully applied to pleadings that state a claim for relief.6
* Associate Professor, North Carolina Central University School of Law. I am grateful to
Jowanda E.C. Jones, Class of 2012, NCCU School of Law, and to Khimmara Greer, Class of
2011, NCCU School of Law, for their excellent research assistance. I would also like to thank
Jaamal Jennings, Class of 2012, NCCU School of Law, for asking the question that prompted this
article.
1. Charles E. Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and InterpretingProcedural Codes and
Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 493, 498 and 507-08 (1950).
2. See Charles E. Clark, The Role of the Supreme Court in FederalRule-Making, 46 J. AM.
JUD. Soc. 250, 251 (1963). (The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in 1937 and became effective on September 16, 1938.).
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1) (2009) (amended 2009); see 3 JAMES WM. MoORE ET AL.,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 15App.01[1] (3d ed. 2010) (indicating in 2007 that
"[s]ubdivisions (a) and (b), dealing, respectively, with Amendments and Amendments to Conform to the Evidence, stand substantially as promulgated in 1937").
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1); see also August 2007 - December 2009 Amendments, U.S.
COURTs (December 1, 2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies1FederalRulemaking/
CompletedRules/Aug07DecG9Amendments.aspx. (The 2009 amendment to Rule 15 was proposed in August of 2007 as part of a package of amendments that became effective on December
1, 2009.).
5. See infra Part I. C.
6. Pleadings that state a claim for relief include the complaint, an answer that states a
counterclaim, any pleading that states a cross-claim, and a third-party complaint. FED. R. Civ. P.
7(a). In the interest of simplicity, the complaint will be used throughout this article to illustrate
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Before the 2009 amendment to Rule 15(a)(1), it was clear that the
time for filing an as of course amendment to the complaint, or any
other pleading stating a claim, ended with the service of a responsive
pleading.' However, in modern litigation, the time for filing a responsive pleading is frequently prolonged by one or more extensions of
time, as well as, by the filing of motions under Rule 12.8 Because
these events did not impact the plaintiff's time for amending her complaint as a matter of course under the pre-amendment version of Rule
15(a)(1), the rule typically allowed the plaintiff to enjoy a lengthy period to refine her complaint outside the trial judge's supervision.' The
2009 amendment to Rule 15(a)(1) was intended to curtail this possibility by limiting the plaintiff's as of course amendment to a period ending twenty-one days after the service of the earlier of a responsive
pleading or motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f).' 0
The amendment accomplishes this goal, however, it is drafted in an
unfortunate manner that introduces ambiguity into the previously
clear timing for as of course amendments to pleadings that state a
claim, including the complaint. In fact, in its current form, the
amended rule is capable of no fewer than three alternative interpretations when applied to pleadings that state a claim." Although the
amendment is still new, early discussions of the amended rule in judicial opinions and treatises reveal a great deal of unwitting confusion
about the timing of amendments under this rule.1 2
The first and most obvious reading of amended Rule 15(a)(1) looks
to the plain language of the rule to allow one amendment to the complaint as a matter of course within two discrete - but possibly disconnected - time periods: first, for a period of twenty-one days after the
complaint is served, and then, again for a second period of twenty-one
days after service of the earlier of a responsive pleading or Rule 12
motion.13 Although this reading follows the literal language of the
amended rule, it will frequently produce an anomalous gap during the

the ambiguity introduced by the 2009 amendment; however, this ambiguity is equally present in
any other pleading that states a claim.
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (2009) (amended 2009). In the most common paradigm, the service of the answer terminated the plaintiffs right to amend her complaint as a matter of course.
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 12.

9. See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
10. The ending date of this time period is clear under the amended rule. The ambiguity is
created by the amendment's failure to specify the event that triggers the beginning of the period.
See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part It.
13. See infra Part II. A.
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amendment period,1 4 and it does not accurately express the stated
purposes of the amendment."
The second plausible interpretation of amended Rule 15(a)(1) allows the complaint to be amended once as a matter of course for a
twenty-one day period that begins with the service of the earlier of
either the answer or Rule 12(b), (e), or (f) motion.1 6 Although this is
not the cleanest reading of the amended rule, it is consistent with the
structure of the prior version of Rule 15(a)(1) and creates synchrony
between the amended rule's application to the answer - which is
clearly and unambiguously governed only by Rule 15(a)(1)(A) - and
its application to the complaint, which under this interpretation is governed only by Rule 15(a)(1)(B)." However, this interpretation
reduces the time for as of course amendments to complaints to one
twenty-one day period with a start-date controlled by the defendant.'s
It also produces an even larger and earlier procedural gap, during
which no amendment as of course will be possible.19 For these reasons, it is also unlikely that this interpretation expresses the intended
meaning of the amended rule.
Finally, the third possible interpretation of the amended rule allows
the complaint to be amended for a period that begins with the service
of the complaint and continues, without interruption, until twenty-one
days after the service of the earlier of either the answer or a motion
under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f).20 This interpretation is not found in the
plain language of the rule and has the least textual support. Neyertheless, it produces the most common-sense result and best expresses the
meaning of contemporaneous statements of intention made by the
drafters of the amended rule.21
An early survey of judicial decisions applying the amended rule
reveals that trial judges are responding to the unnoticed ambiguity in
amended Rule 15(a)(1) by reading the rule in different ways with little
discussion.2 2 Reasonably enough, almost all of these decisions adhere
to the plain language of the amended rule and follow the first or second interpretations, even when this produces an anomalous result and
even though these interpretations are inconsistent with one another
and with the stated aims of the amendment's drafters.2 3 This inconsis14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

infra Part II. A.
infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
infra Part 11. B.
infra Part II. B.
infra Part II. B.
infra Part II. B.
infra Part II. C.
infra Part I. C.
infra Part II
infra Parts II. A-B.
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tency is also reflected in major treatises on federal practice and procedure, which have interpreted amended Rule 15(a)(1) in different
ways.24
Over time, this inconsistency promises to cause harm in several
ways. First, an ambiguity in Rule 15(a)(1) that causes procedural variances stands to undermine the principle of uniformity that grounds
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This lack of uniformity makes
the process of litigation less predictable for all parties, attorneys, and
judges involved. Second, and more pragmatically, the first and second
possible readings of amended Rule 15(a)(1) establish an unnecessarily
short period for plaintiffs to amend complaints as a matter of course.
The plaintiff's right to amend the complaint without the court's leave
assumes more importance in light of the heightened pleading standards recently adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal

and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. 26 Furthermore,

given the wide-spread impact of the Iqbal/Twombly decisions on federal litigation,2 7 an unresolved ambiguity in Rule 15(a)(1) has real potential to impede the enforcement of valid claims in federal court.28
This article explores the ambiguity introduced by the 2009 amendment to Rule 15(a)(1). Part I provides a brief history of Rule 15(a),
outlines the mechanics of the rule's operation before it was amended
in December of 2009, and examines the procedural shortfalls that led
to the 2009 amendment. Part II takes a closer look at the 2009
amendment to Rule 15(a) by parsing the ambiguous timing language,
24. See infra notes 116-17, 153-56 and accompanying text (describing the different interpretations of amended Rule 15(a)(1) reached in WRIGHT, MILLER, KANE & MARCUS ON FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE and in MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE).
25. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
after Iqbal and Twombly, a complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 1949 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). This plausibility standard is much tighter than the Supreme
Court's previous long-standing guidance that a claim should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6)
only when it appeared beyond doubt that the pleader could prove no set of facts that would
entitle him to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
26. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
27. As of July 19, 2010, Iqbal, which was decided on May 18, 2009, had been cited 10,925
times in case law and an additional 444 times in law review articles. Also, as of July 19, 2010,
Twombly, which was decided on May 21, 2007, had been cited 30,579 times in case law and an
additional 1,081 times in law review articles.
28. If an amendment as a matter of course is not possible under Rule 15(a)(1), the plaintiff
is required to seek leave of court to amend under Rule 15(a)(2). FED. R. Clv. P. 15(a)(2).
Amendments under Rule 15(a)(2) are denied when the amendment is rendered futile because
the amended complaint would be subject to immediate dismissal. See, e.g., Coventry First, LLC
v. McCarty, 605 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2010); Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 2001). The
heightened pleading standard imposed by Iqbal and Twombly increases the likelihood that a
trial court may deny leave to amend on the ground of futility. The practical impact of this will be
to reduce the number of cases in which plaintiffs reach the discovery phase and are allowed to
fully develop evidence to support their claims.
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analyzing its three possible interpretations, and demonstrating the reality of the confusion by examining conflicting discussions of the
amended rule in judicial decisions and treatises. Finally, Part III concludes that the best outcome is achieved by reading Rule 15(a)(1) to
provide an uninterrupted period for as of course amendments that begins with the service of the complaint and ends twenty-one days after
the service of the earlier of either the answer or Rule 12(b), (e), or (f)
motion.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULE 15(A) BEFORE

2009

Before December 1, 2009, Rule 15(a) used the following language
to provide for pre-trial amendments to pleadings:
(a) Amendments Before Trial.
(1) Amending as a Matter of Course. A party may amend its
pleading once as a matter of course:
(A) before being served with a responsive pleading; or
(B) within 20 days after serving the pleading if a responsive
pleading is not allowed and the action is not yet on the
trial calendar.
(2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its
pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the
court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice
so requires.2 9
The significance of the phrase "as a matter of course" becomes clear
when Rule 15(a)(1) is read in opposition to Rule 15(a)(2).30 Rule
15(a)(1) provides parties with one, time-limited, chance to amend any
pleading without seeking permission from the judge or from opposing
parties. 31 Generally speaking, amendments under Rule 15(a)(1) are
allowed as of right, meaning that the court does not have discretion to
deny a timely amendment made under this rule.32
Amendments as a matter of course allow parties to correct mistakes
and cure omissions quickly without wasting judicial resources on a
hearing. These amendments also increase the odds that issues will be
joined on the merits and that cases will not be dismissed based on
technical or easily curable errors. Lastly, amendments as a matter of
course help ensure that blameless litigants will not be penalized by
mistakes made by their attorneys. Because amendments as a matter
of course serve these important functions, they have been a part of
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (2009) (amended 2009) (omitting Rule 15(a)(3) which then, as
now, provides the time for responding to an amended pleading).
30. Id.
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1) (2009) (amended 2009).
32. See, e.g., Galustian v. Peter, 591 F.3d 724 (4th Cir. 2010); Caine v. Hardy, 905 F.2d 858
(5th Cir. 1990); Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2007).
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federal practice since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
A.

A Brief History of Amendments to Pleadings

Historically, amendments to pleadings have been available in common law procedural systems with a level of ease that bears an inverse
relationship to the importance of pleadings within the procedural system itself.3 4 Until the middle of the Fourteenth Century, English common law used a system of oral pleading in which "the parties or their
counsel were permitted to change or adjust their pleadings as the oral
altercation proceeded, and were not held to any specific form of allegation put forward." 3 With the advent of written pleadings, formalism increased and amending became simultaneously more difficult,36
with the result that "by the 14th and 15th centuries ... abuses grew up

and cases were constantly thrown out of court and judgments arrested
and reversed for errors of form." These abuses were caused by an
intricate system of writ pleading in which "pleading in practice degenerated into a baleful game of skill" used to cabin the substantive
rights, remedies, and defenses of the parties.
In response, Parliament enacted a series of statutes, known as the
Statutes of Jeofails, expressly providing for the acknowledgement and
correction of errors in pleading.3 9 Twenty separate Statutes of Jeofails
were enacted in England between 1340 and 1852 to address particularized needs for amendment. 4 0 By 1875, English pleading procedures
had sufficiently liberalized to allow parties one amendment, without
leave, "at any time before the expiration of the time limited for reply
and before replying, or, where no defence (sic) is delivered, at any
time before the expiration of four weeks from the appearance of the
defendant who shall have last appeared." 4 1
33. Alison Reppy, Aider, Amendment and the Statutes of Jeofails - At Common Law, Under
Modern Codes, Practice Acts and Rules of Civil Procedure - Pt. 1, 6 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 66-67
(1957).
34. Id.
35. Id.
L.
36. Charles E. Clark & Ruth A. Yerion, Amendment and Aider of Pleadings, 12 MI.
REV. 97, 97 (1928).

37. Id.
38. KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 17 (2005).
39. Reppy, supra note 33, at 68-69. For additional descriptions of the Statutes of Jeofails,
see, e.g., Clark & Yerion, supra note 36; CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE

PLEADING 703-05 (West Publishing Co. 2d ed. 1947) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
40. Reppy, supra note 33, at 78-90. The wooden nature of the system of writ pleading used
in England during this period made a sequence of statutes necessary to cure problems as they
developed and were recognized. Id.
41. Clark & Yerion, supra note 36, at 100, n.14 (quoting 38 & 39 Vict., 1st Schedule, Rules
of Court, Order 28, Rule 2; Annual Practice 1927). Until the 2009 amendment, Federal Rule
15(a) effectively tracked these rules of pleading amendment.
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This developing structure, which was further complicated by the historic division between the English common law and equity systems,4 2
was transplanted to the United States and to other countries colonized
by the British.4 3 In the United States, federalism added yet another
layer of complexity, with separate systems of law and equity employed
at the federal level and joined by a welter of different state systems of
law and equity. 4 4 In the Nineteenth Century, David Dudley Field began a procedural reform movement in the United States that called
for the merger of law and equity into "one form of action" 45 with one
merged and simplified set of procedural rules. 4 6 The Field Code,
which was first adopted in New York in 1848 and then rapidly spread
to other states, drew on equity practice to liberalize the procedures for
pleading, pleading amendments, and the rules for joinder of claims
and parties.4 7
The classic analysis of code pleading in the United States is found in
Charles E. Clark's Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading,originally
published in 1928.48 In his Handbook, Judge Clark notes that:
In many codes, a whole chapter is given to amendments, and generally
in the others numerous sections are devoted to the subject. In practically all states, [sic] there are also statutes dealing with the effect of
variance between pleading and proof. The statutes on amendments
provide first for amendments without leave of court if made within a
certain period, and second, for amendments by permission of the
court.49

Judge Clark describes statutes to this effect in twenty-eight different
states and territories. 0 To illustrate amendments without leave, he
42. See, e.g., Stephen M. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedurein Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987) (describing the English division between common law courts and equity courts).
43. See, e.g., CLERMONT, supra note 38, at 5-26 (2005).
44. Id. at 26 ("The American states basically followed the English model until the code
reforms of the 1800s.").
45. Thomas 0. Main, TraditionalEquity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV.
429, 465 (2003) (citing N.Y. LAws, c. 510 § 62 (71st Sess., Apr. 12, 1848)).
46. Main, supra note 45, at 466-67.
47. Main, supra note 45, at 467.
48. HANDBOOK, supra note 39, at 708. Charles E. Clark became Dean of Yale Law School
in 1929 and in 1935 became Reporter of the Advisory Committee that drafted the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Clark was subsequently appointed to serve as a federal appellate judge on
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Fred Rodell, For Charles E. Clark: A Brief and Belated but
Fond Farewell,65 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1323 (1965). "With justification, Clark has been called
the 'prime instigator and architect of the rules of federal civil procedure."' Subrin, supra note
42, at 961 (quoting Rodell, supra). See generally Charles E. Clark, Prefaceto PROCEDURE - THE
HANDMAID OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS OF CHARLES E. CLARK (C. Wright & H. Reasoner eds., 1965)
(containing an excellent biography of Judge Clark).
49. HANDBOOK, supra note 39, at 708.
50. HANDBOOK, supra note 39, at 708 nn.28-29.
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used a Montana statute that bears a remarkable similarity to the original version of Federal Rule 15(a) adopted ten years later in 1938:
Any pleading may be amended once by the party of course, and without costs, at any time before answer or demurrer filed or twenty days
after demurrer and before the trial of the issue thereon, by filing the
same as amended and serving a copy on the adverse party, who may
have twenty days thereafter in which to answer, reply or demur to the
amended pleading.51
Judge Clark's discussion and summary of state statutes shows that by
1928, lawyers in the United States were already accustomed to the
idea that pleadings could be amended as a matter of course.
Before the adoption of the Federal Rules, federal courts were required to follow state procedure in cases at law, 5 2 but applied a uniform set of federal procedural rules in equity cases.5 As a result,
federal courts used two separate sets of procedural rules for cases at
law and equity until the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
adopted and explicitly merged law and equity into "one form of action." 54 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ultimately adopted in
1938 represent a blend of then-available procedures that drew from
equity to greatly liberalize pleading and discovery in ways that ultimately "open[ed] the way for plaintiffs to explore and expand new
frontiers of substantive liability .

. ..

As a major component of these reforms, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure established a uniform pleading system for use in all civil
cases filed in federal court.5 6 Federal Rule 8 implemented a flexible
system of notice pleading that, when coupled with the expanded dis51. HANDBOOK, supra note 39, at 708-09 (quoting Mont. Rev. Codes Ann., Anderson &
McFarland, 1935, § 9186.)
52. See Main, supra note 45, at 470 (describing the federal Conformity Acts that required
federal courts to follow state procedure in law cases).See Stephen Burbank, The Rules Enabling
Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1040 (1982).
53. Burbank, supra note 52, at 1039 ("In all states, it remained necessary for lawyers practicing in federal court to master a discrete federal equity procedure.").
54. Subrin, supra note 42, at 920. See FED. R. Civ. P. 2. (There is one form of action -the
civil action.").
55. Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bath water: The Prospects for ProceduralProgress,59
BROOK. L. REV. 761, 783, 785 (1993).
56. See Charles E. Clark & James Win. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: II. Pleadings and Parties,44 YALE L.J. 1291 (1935) (describing the development of the pleading rules that
would be adopted three years later in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Clark and Moore
emphasized the need for uniformity in federal procedure by describing the status of federal
procedure under the Conformity Act that required each federal court to conform procedure in
law cases to applicable state procedure. "Under the present system the Conformity Act controls
actions at law so that the federal attitude toward the pleadings in law actions is determined by
that of the state where the federal district court is sitting. Thus pleadings have been construed
strictly in some states and liberally in others; and amendments have been refused, permitted, or
deemed immaterial when not made, in general accord with the attitude of the applicable state
practice toward variance and failure of proof." Id. at 1299-1300.
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covery mechanisms provided in Rules 26-37 and the provision for
summary judgment in Rule 56, de-emphasized the importance of
pleading by allowing parties to develop "elements of proof" after the
pleadings were complete.
Although it was no longer necessary or possible for the parties to
forecast the structure of pending litigation with complete accuracy in
their pleadings, the pleadings remained the key roadmap to the
claims, defenses, and issues joined in any particular case. 5 ' As a result, the reduced role of pleading under the Federal Rules paradoxically increased the importance of amendments to pleadings.5 9 As
initial pleadings grew less informative, it became imperative that the
Federal Rules allow parties to freely amend their pleadings to correct
mistakes, add or subtract claims, defenses, or parties, and conform the
pleadings to the proof actually developed in the case. 6 0 As a result,
the system of amendment allowed in Federal Rule 15(a) was created.
B.

The Mechanics of Amending Pleadings "As a Matter of Course"
before December 2009

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set up a litigation structure in
which "the preliminary paper pleadings in advance of trial" assume a
"subordinate character." 61 To facilitate this system, Rule 15 was
drafted to allow pleadings to be amended sometimes as a matter of
course and, otherwise, whenever "justice so requires."62 The liberal
character of Rule 15 is best illustrated by Rule 15(b), allowing for
amendments during and after trial to match the evidence presented
and issues actually tried, and Rule 15(c), allowing certain amendments
57. This view of the relationship between pleading, discovery, and summary judgment is so
commonly accepted today as to be axiomatic. However, it was the product of deliberate study
and planning by the framers of the Federal Rules. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, The Handmaidof
Justice, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 297, 318 (1938) ("Attempted use of the pleadings as proof is now less
necessary than ever with the development of two devices to supply such elements of proof as
may be necessary before trial. These are discovery and summary judgment, both the subject of
extensive provisions in the new rules.").
58. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8 (requiring pleadings to provide "short and plain" statements of
claims for relief, defenses, and responsive positions).
59. Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading,2 F.R.D. 456, 467 (1943) [hereinafter Simplified
Pleading] ("In the pleading system here visualized, the rule of amendment must, of course, assume great importance.") Simplified Pleadingwas published after Judge Clark was appointed to
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and presents the interesting perspective of a judge who is
now called upon to execute the system of rules that he played a principal role in shaping and
drafting.
60. Clark & Moore, supra note 56, at 1300-01 (linking amendments to pleading objectives
and noting that "amendment should be freely had, for nothing is to be gained under a unified
procedure in forcing the parties to start over").
61. Simplified Pleading, supra note 59, at 467.
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Of course, pleadings may also be amended at any time with the
written consent of the opposing party. Id.
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to relate back to the filing of the original pleading after the expiration
of the statute of limitations." Rule 15(d) goes a step further and permits the court "on just terms" to allow parties to serve supplemental
pleadings adding transactions occurring after the date of the original
pleading, "even though the original pleading is defective in stating a
claim or defense." 6 4
The framers of the Federal Rules consciously intended to promote
amendments and included a number of other Federal Rules that reinforce the ability of parties to amend pleadings by preventing dismissal
or reversal for "matters not going to substance."65 In their original
form, these included:
Rule 1, requiring the construction of the rules 'to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action'; Rule 4(h)
[now 4(a)(2)], for amendment of process or proof of service; Rule 8(f)
[now 8(e)],

. .

. as to the construction of pleadings; and Rule 60(b)

[now 60(b)(1)], providing for relief to a party from an action taken
against him 'through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect.' This is followed by a definite general rule, 61, as to harmless
error, providing against reversal, 'unless refusal to take such action
appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the
parties.'66
Taken as a whole, these rules very clearly express their drafters' view
that pleading defects should not prevent the court from adjudicating a
case on the merits.67
Within this system, Rule 15(a) provides the general rules for the
amendment of pleadings, with Rule 15(a)(1) providing for amendments as a matter of course, and Rule 15(a)(2) addressing all other
amendments. Until the December 1, 2009 amendment, Rule 15(a)(1)
allowed any party to amend a pleading once as a matter of course
before being served with a responsive pleading 68 or within 20 days
after serving the pleading if a responsive pleading was not allowed and
the action was not yet on a trial calendar.6 9
This rule drew a clean and unambiguous line between the pleadings
governed by subsections (A) and (B), with Rule 15(a)(1)(A) applying
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b)- (c).
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(d).
65. Simplified Pleading,supra note 59, at 468.
66. Id.
67. Id. Congress reinforced this policy in 1948 by adopting 28 U.S.C. § 1653 which reads
"Defective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended, upon terms, in the trial or appellate
courts." 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (2010).
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A) (2009) (amended 2009).
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B) (2009) (amended 2009).
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only to pleadings that themselves demand a responsive pleading. 0 By
definition, this is the universe of pleadings that state claims for relief including the complaint, counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party
complaints." The rule allowed these pleadings to be amended once as
a matter of course until the pleader was served with a responsive
pleading.7 2 Because motions are not responsive pleadings, the right to
amend under this version of Rule 15(a)(1)(A) was not terminated by
the filing of any motion, including the ubiquitous motions for extensions of time and Rule 12(b) motions to dismiss." As a result, the
rule created the possibility that the plaintiff's right to amend the complaint as a matter of course could extend for considerably longer than
the twenty-day period for filing a responsive pleading then provided
by Rule 12(a).7 4
Before the 2009 amendment, it was equally clear that pleadings that
do not require a responsive pleading were governed by Rule
15(a)(1)(B). By definition, the pleadings governed by subsection (B)
would thus be responsive pleadings that did not themselves state a
claim for relief - including answers to complaints, counterclaims,
cross-claims, and third-party complaints." The rule strictly limited the
time for as of course amendments to these responsive pleadings to a
mere twenty days from the date that the responsive pleading was
served." This short time limit reflected the fact that these pleadings
would never need to be amended to adjust to points made in a responsive pleading.7
70. Simplified Pleading, supra note 59, at 468.
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a).
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A).
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b), 12(b). See, e.g., Smith v. Blackledge, 451 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1971)
(defendant's motion to dismiss was not a responsive pleading); Winget v. JP Morgan Chase
Bank, N.A., 537 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2008) (same); Foster v. DeLuca, 545 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2008)
(same); Coventry First, LLC v. McCarty, 605 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2010) (same). It is fair to
characterize Rule 12(b) motions to dismiss as ubiquitous in federal litigation. A recent empirical
study from the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts shows that at least one Rule 12(b) motion
to dismiss was filed in 68% of all federal cases during two periods of comparison in 2007 and
2009-10. See Motions to Dismiss Information on Collection of Data, U.S. COURTS, (Apr. 13,
2010), - http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Motions%20to%20Dismiss
042710.pdf (comparing the nine months preceding Twombly with the nine months after lqbal).
74. In a typical case, the Rule 15(a)(1) period for amending the complaint would extend for
several months, but it is possible to find cases in which it lasted for much longer. See, e.g.,
Winget, 537 F.3d 565; Stein v. Royal Bank of Canada, 239 F.3d 389 (1st Cir. 2001); State Capital
Title Abstract Co. v. Pappas Bus. Servs., LLC, 646 F. Supp. 2d 668 (D.N.J. 2009) (original complaint filed on July 25, 2008, followed by first amended complaint on December 11, 2008).
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a).
76. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B).
77. This reasoning remains apparent in the strictly limited time for as of course amendments to responsive pleadings under amended Rule 15.
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The vast majority of courts have viewed the right to amend as of
course under Rule 15(a)(1) as an absolute right," whose existence is
justified on the grounds of judicial economy and the unlikelihood of
prejudice to opposing parties.7 9 Rule 15(a)(1) assumes that it would
be wasteful to require judicial involvement in these amendments because a judge would be highly unlikely to deny an amendment advanced so early in the case.80 However, this logic breaks down in
actual practice - particularly in complex litigation - and much of the

impetus for amending Rule 15(a)(1) came from federal judges
themselves.81
C.

Shortfalls in the Process: The Reasons Behind the December
2009 Amendment

Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure originate with
a recommendation from the Civil Rules Advisory Committee to the
Judicial Conference's Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 82 and are the product of a deliberative process that is comprehensively documented in the Advisory Committee's Minutes and
Reports. As a result, the Advisory Committee Minutes and Reports
leading up to the 2009 amendment to Rule 15(a)(1) provide a reliable
78. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. Despite the clarity of the rule, a few decisions in cases filed by pro se prisoners hold that "[e]ven when a party may amend as a matter of
course, leave to amend may be denied if there is bad faith, undue prejudice to the opposing
party, or futility of amendment." Abebe v. Richland County, No. 2:09-2469-MBS, 2010 WL
2431062, at *5 (D.S.C. June 14, 2010) (citing United States v. Pittman, 209 F.3d 314 (4th Cir.
2000)) (refusing to allow as of course amendment adding a time-barred claim in a case seeking
post-conviction relief). These decisions take the liberty of importing the Supreme Court's analysis for denying leave to amend under Rule 15(a)(2) into Rule 15(a)(1). See Foman v. Davis, 372
U.S. 178 (1962) (holding that leave to amend should be freely given in the absence of undue
delay, bad faith, or undue prejudice to opposing party).
79. 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE & RICHARD L.
MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1480 (3d ed. 1990).
80. Id.
81. See infra Part I. C.
82. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a), Congress retains ultimate authority over all federal
rules; however, Congress delegated practical responsibility for federal rulemaking to the Supreme Court in the Rules Enabling Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2072. The Supreme Court, in turn, has
delegated its rulemaking responsibility to the Judicial Conference of the United States, which
maintains a standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (the "Standing Committee"). 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b). 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(2) authorizes the Judicial Conference to appoint
Advisory Committees to assist the Standing Committee with rules of federal civil, criminal, appellate, and bankruptcy procedure, as well as with federal rules of evidence. Members of the
Standing and Advisory Committees are drawn from the bench, practicing bar, and academia. A
concise summary of the federal rulemaking process is available on the United State Courts
website published by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/
RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulemakingProcess.aspx.
83. The Reports and Minutes of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee are available at
the website of the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies.
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guide to the procedural problems that led the Committee to propose
changes to the rule. These materials show that the prior version of
Rule 15(a)(1) was the target of criticism from the defense bar because
of perceived plaintiff-bias,8 4 and was also criticized by federal trial
judges who expressed "irritation ... over the experience of encountering an amended complaint filed after submission of a motion to dismiss." 5 Both sets of concerns indicate that dissatisfaction with the
existing rule was focused on its use by the plaintiffs' bar.8 6
The first and foremost source of frustration was the "seemingly odd
provision in [former] Rule 15(a) that cut[ ] off the right to amend once
as a matter of course on the filing of a responsive pleading but not on
the filing of a responsive motion."" Judges found this distinction unnecessary and wasteful because the right to amend survived "the motion, argument of the motion, deliberation by the court," and
sometimes "even a decision granting the motion."8 8 This allowed the
plaintiff to test the court's response to the defendant's motion and file
an amended complaint that not only addressed the court's concerns,
but also benefitted from the judge's investment of research, court
time, and effort in drafting an order."
84. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Report of the Civil

Rules Advisory Committee, U.S. COURTS, 8, (Dec. 12, 2006) http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV12-2006.pdf

(addressing concerns from a "practitioner who

primarily represents defendants").
85.

See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Minutes: Civil Rules

Advisory Committee, October27-28, 2005, U.S. COURTS, 10, (June 1, 2006) http://www.uscourts.
gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV11-2005-min.pdf ("Judges have suggested that
this should be changed.").
86. Id. "Our discussions started with the belief that, as presently drafted, Rule 15(a) has
resulted, in the usual context of a plaintiff desiring to amend the complaint, in both an unnecessary burden on district judges, and undue advantage to the plaintiff." Report of the Civil Rules
Advisory Committee, supra note 84. See also COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCE-

DURE, Minutes: Civil Rules Advisory Committee, May 22-23, 2006, U.S. COURTS, 23, (June 1,
2006) http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV05-2006-min.pdf
(noting that "important changes are recommended for [amendments to] a pleading to which a
responsive pleading is required").
87. Minutes: Civil Rules Advisory Committee, October 27-28, 2005, supra note 85, at 9-10.
88. Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, supra note 84, at 6. Unless the judge's
order dismissed the case with prejudice, many courts held that the plaintiff retained the right to
amend the complaint as a matter of course. See, e.g., Richardson v. United States, 336 F.2d 265
(9th Cir. 1964) (plaintiff has the right to amend when defendant has successfully moved to dismiss but has not yet filed a responsive pleading); Hagee v. City of Evanston, 95 F.R.D. 344 (N.D.
Ill. 1982) (plaintiff's right to amend survives the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss). In
this situation, courts also have the power to conditionally grant the defendant's motion to dismiss while simultaneously granting leave to amend to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Brever v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 40 F.3d 1119, 1131 (10th Cir. 1994) (district court had "authority to dismiss the case
with or without leave to amend the complaint").
89. This concern is repeatedly mentioned in the Advisory Committee Reports and Minutes.
See, e.g., Minutes: Civil Rules Advisory Committee, May 22-23, 2006, supra note 85, at 24 ("Some
judges regularly encounter the frustration of investing time in a motion only to find an amendment of the challenged pleading.").
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A second related concern centered on the impact of the plaintiff's
Rule 15(a)(1) amendment on the defendant. Like judges, the defendant's bar expressed annoyance with the fact that former Rule
15(a)(1) allowed the plaintiff's attorney to benefit from the defendant's work on a Rule 12 motion.9 0 This "free rider" effect 91 was perceived as an unfair shifting of litigation costs from the plaintiff to the
defendant.
Much commercial litigation is driven by cost[s] and the advantage to
be gained by shifting costs onto the opposing party. A plaintiff wants
to threaten the defendant with litigation costs such as discovery to
compel settlement, while incurring as few costs as possible - costs such
as researching the law. The plaintiff knows that the defendant will
most likely file a motion to dismiss, which will educate the plaintiff
about the law, and that - after imposing on the defendant the cost of
preparing the motion to dismiss - the plaintiff can take that 'free' legal
learning and craft a better complaint, one which may withstand a motion to dismiss and open the gates to discovery. This is obviously a
situation that is very frustrating for defendants.9 2
Defendants used this jaundiced view of the plaintiffs' bar to argue that
the plaintiff's right to amend as a matter of course should be cut off by
the filing of a responsive pleading or motion to dismiss - a position
that was ultimately rejected by the Advisory Committee and is not
reflected in the amended rule. 93
Finally, former Rule 15(a)(1) was seen as a source of gratuitous delay and potential prejudice during the pretrial phase of litigation. 94
Judges and defendants' attorneys feared that the plaintiff's right to
amend the complaint in response to Rule 12 motions encouraged
careless drafting of complaints by the plaintiffs' bar.9 5 This, in turn,
had the potential to prolong the proceedings by allowing the plaintiff
90. Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, supra note 84, at 7 (noting the defendant's "ability to deny the plaintiff the benefit of a free ride on the defendant's legal research, by
answering and then filing a motion to dismiss").
91. "A free ride occurs when one party to an arrangement reaps benefits for which another
party pays, though that transfer of wealth is not part of the agreement between them." Rothery
Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
92. Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, supra note 84, at 7.
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1).
94. This concern is explicitly addressed in the Advisory Committee Note to the 2009
amendment, which notes that new language in the rule terminates the right to amend once as a
matter of course 21 days after service of the earlier of the responsive pleading or motion under
Rule 12(b), (e), or (f). FED. R. Civ. P. 15 advisory committee's note ("This provision will force
the pleader to consider carefully and promptly the wisdom of amending to meet the arguments
in the motion."). This is a theme that runs through the Advisory Committee Minutes and Reports leading up to the amendment. See, e.g., Minutes: Civil Rules Advisory Committee, May 2223, 2006, supra note 85, at 24 ("The right [to amend] persists indefinitely.... The [rule] amendment will support better judicial management and expedite disposition.").
95. Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, supra note 84, at 7 (noting that the "cost
and risk" attendant on motions for leave to amend "should lead at least some plaintiffs to pre-
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a risk-free trial of the original complaint followed by an unreviewable
opportunity to revamp the complaint and raise a new set of issues. 96
Since Rule 15(a)(1) amendments do not require leave, the potential
harm was compounded by the fact that the rule did not allow courts to
protect defendants from any prejudice that might flow from a latefiled amendment. 97
The case law relating to Rule 15(a)(1) amendments provides empirical support for the anecdotal discussions found in the Advisory Committee Minutes and Reports. Judicial decisions illustrate the reality of
the problem by documenting that as of course amended complaints
were frequently filed in response to motions to dismiss, 98 sometimes
long after the original complaint,9 9 and sometimes after the original
complaint had been dismissed. 1" The 2009 amendment to Rule
15(a)(1) was intended to address these concerns and reflects the Advisory Committee's clear intention to shorten the time for amendments
as a matter of course to the complaint. And, in fact, the time at which
this period ends under the amended rule is generally clear. The ambipare more thoughtful, better researched initial complaints - a benefit to judges and defendants
alike").
96. Id. at 9 (noting that "[t]he amended rule will require the plaintiff to 'fish or cut bait'
about amending the complaint within twenty-one days after service of the motion to dismiss,
rather than waiting").
97. The rule did allow the defendant to cut off the plaintiff's right to amend merely by filing
an answer; however, the defendant's attorney sacrificed certain strategic advantages by filing an
answer in lieu of a pre-answer motion to dismiss. For example, a pending pre-answer motion to
dismiss tolls the defendant's obligation to answer the complaint. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4).
This gives the defendant more time to investigate and plan an intelligent response to the complaint. If successful, a pre-answer motion to dismiss also benefits the defendant by ending the
litigation without the expense of taking the litigation any further. Because of these advantages,
"a motion to dismiss is most often filed before an answer." Report of the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee, supra note 84, at 9.
98. See, e.g., Willis v. Collins, 989 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1993) (prisoner's response to motion to
dismiss construed as amended complaint); Taj Mahal Enters., Ltd. v. Trump, 745 F. Supp. 240
(D.N.J. 1990) (plaintiff amended complaint in response to motion to strike and dismiss); Murray
v. West Palm Beach Hous. Auth., No. 08-80396-CIV, 2008 WL 4927007 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2008)
(response to motion to dismiss construed as amended complaint).
99. Although the gap between the original and amended complaints would typically last for
several months, it is possible to find cases in which the gap stretches for much longer. See, e.g.,
Vitullo v. Mancini, 684 F. Supp. 2d 747 (E.D. Va. 2010) (four months); Milliner v. DiGuglielmo,
No. 08-4905, 2010 WL 972151 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2010) (nine months); Sahu v. Union Carbide
Corp., No. 04 Civ. 8825(JFK), 2010 WL 2473585 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2010) (case pending 5 1h
years). In Sahu, the defendant had filed a motion to dismiss, but no responsive pleading. Five
and one-half years after filing the original complaint, the plaintiff asked the court for a ruling
that the 2009 version of Rule 15(a) would apply to any amended complaint. Because the plaintiff had not yet filed an amended complaint, the court denied plaintiff's motion on the ground
that it sought an advisory opinion. Sahu, 2010 WL 2473585.
100. See, e.g., Stein v. Royal Bank of Canada, 239 F.3d 389 (1st Cir. 2001) (plaintiff free to
amend complaint until entry of judgment on order of dismissal); Camp v. Gregory, 67 F.3d 1286
(7th Cir. 1995); Rick-Mik Enters. v. Equilon Enters., 532 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2008); Mayes v.
Leipziger, 729 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1984); but see Acevedo-Villabos v. Hernandez, 22 F.3d 384 (1st
Cir. 1994); Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998).
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guity in amended Rule 15(a)(1) becomes apparent only when considering the point at which the window for amendment begins, something
that was not the focus of the Advisory Committee's efforts.
II.

THE AMBIGUOUs

2009

AMENDMENT TO RULE

15(A)(1)

As amended on December 1, 2009, Rule 15(a) uses the following
language to provide for pre-trial amendments to pleadings:
(a) Amendments Before Trial.
(1) Amending as a Matter of Course. A party may amend its

pleading once as a matter of course within:
(A) 21 days after serving it, or
(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is
required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or

21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or
(f), whichever is earlier.

(2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its
pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the
court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice
so requires. 101
The amendment made no changes to Rule 15(a)(2), but it revised
Rule 15(a)(1) in ways that have both intended and unexpected
consequences.
The Advisory Committee Note explains that the 2009 amendment
was intended to make "three changes in the time allowed to make one
amendment as a matter of course."1 0 2 First, the Committee intended
to eliminate the distinction between responsive pleadings and Rule 12
motions, with the result that the right to amend once as a matter of
course now ends twenty-one days after service of the earliest motion
under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f)."o' Second, the right to amend once as a
matter of course no longer ends when a responsive pleading is filed;
instead, the pleader is given twenty-one days after the service of a
responsive pleading to amend as a matter of course.'" The Committee Note wards off a potential ambiguity here by clarifying that these
two time periods are "not cumulative," indicating that the right to
amend as a matter of course will end twenty-one days after service of
the earlier of a responsive pleading or any motion made under Rule
12(b), (e), or (f). 0 5 Finally, the third intended change "extends from
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

R. Civ. P. 15(a).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 advisory committee's note.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FED.
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20 to 21 days the period to amend a pleading to which no responsive

pleading is allowed."1 0 6
The Advisory Committee Minutes and Reports provide a context
for each of the three intended changes discussed in the Advisory
Committee Note.1o7 The third change, which is directed only at pleadings - like the answer - that require no responsive pleading, was part

of a much larger package of amendments to time-computation rules
primarily expanding times formerly set at ten or twenty days to fourteen or twenty-one days.' 0 s This change is conceptually detached
from the remaining changes to Rule 15(a)(1), and appeared in the
2009 amendment as part of the completion of Advisory Committee's
Rules-wide time computation project.' 0 9
The Advisory Committee materials relating to the first and second
of the intended changes make it clear that they have an entirely different purpose from the third change and are directed at controlling
amendments as of course to complaints and other pleadings that state
claims for relief."0 Although the amendment's focus on amendments
by plaintiffs and other claimants is not expressly stated in the 2009
Advisory Committee Note, it is implicit in the structure of the changes
since responsive pleadings and Rule 12 motions are normally directed
only at pleadings that state a claim for relief. The Advisory Committee Note is equally silent with respect to any concern about past misuse of Rule 15(a)(1) by the plaintiff's bar, although glimmers of
frustration can be gleaned from the Advisory Committee's statements
that the 2009 amendment "will force the pleader to consider carefully
and promptly the wisdom of amending," "expedite determination of
issues that otherwise might be raised seriatim," and "advance other
pretrial proceedings." 1
Unfortunately, the drafters failed to produce an amended rule that
clearly reflects these underlying concerns resulting in an ambiguous
text. The first source of confusion is the amended rule's failure to
clearly define which subsections of Rule 15(a)(1) apply to pleadings
106. Id. The Advisory Committee Note also points out that this portion of the amendment
deletes prior language that cut off the right to amend as a matter of course when the action was
placed on a trial calendar. Id. This deletion recognizes that the function of the trial calendar has
largely been supplanted by the use of pretrial scheduling orders in modern practice. Id.
107. See supra Part I. C.
108. See supra Part 1. C. See, e.g., the 2009 amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 6; FED. R. Civ. P.
12; FED. R. Civ. P. 14; FED. R. Civ. P. 23; FED. R. Civ. P. 27; FED. R. Civ. P. 32; FED. R. Civ. P.
38; FED. R. Civ. P. 50 (expanding 10-day period to 28 days); FED. R. Civ. P. 52 (same); FED. R.
Civ. P. 53; FED. R. Civ. P. 54; FED. R. Civ. P. 55; FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
109. See, e.g., Minutes: Civil Rules Advisory Committee, May 22-23, 2006, supra note 86, at
20-23.
110. See supra Part I. C.
111. FED. R. Civ. P. 15 advisory committee's note.
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that state a claim.11 2 Because the introductory clause of the amended
rule begins with general references to any "party" and any "pleading,""' the literal language of the new rule allows a plaintiff to use
either subsection (A) or (B) to support an amendment as a matter of
course. Although Rule 15(a)(1)(B) limits its application. to pleadings
"to which a responsive pleading is required,"11 4 thereby denying defendants the ability to use this rule to amend the answer, Rule
15(a)(1)(A) contains no language similarly excluding plaintiffs.' 1 5 As
a result, the plain language of the amended rule allows a plaintiff to
amend his complaint once as a matter of course within twenty-one
days after "serving it," 116 or within twenty-one days after service of
the earlier of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f).1 1 7
The words used in the amended rule also create a major structural
change from the pre-amendment version of Rule 15(a)(1), which unquestionably referred plaintiffs to former Rule 15(a)(1)(A) for guidelines on amendments as a matter of course, and equally clearly
excluded plaintiffs from subsection (B). 1 s Although nothing in the
Advisory Committee Minutes, Reports, or Note explains - or even
addresses - this structural change, the new language is so clear that
many courts are following it without comment despite its sometimes
anomalous effects.' 1 9 On the other hand, perhaps because this organizational change is not discussed in the Advisory Committee Note and
runs counter to the straightforward procedure of the old rule, it is being ignored by an equivalent camp of judges who read only Rule
15(a)(1)(B) as applying to the complaint.12 0
The problem is compounded by the amended rule's failure to
clearly identify the point at which the plaintiff's Rule 15(a)(1) right to
amend begins. Although the text of the rule appears to limit the
amendment period to twenty-one days, it is unclear whether the plaintiff has one twenty-one day period that begins with the defendant's
service of a responsive pleading or Rule 12 motion,12 ' two twenty-one
day periods - one beginning with the plaintiff's service of the com112. See infra Part II. A.
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1) ("A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of
course .. . ).
114. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B).
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A).
116. Id.
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B).
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1) (2009) (amended 2009).
119. See infra Part II. A. These courts are joined by a major treatise on federal civil procedure, WRIGHT, MILLER, KANE, & MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.

See infra

notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
120. See infra Part II. B. This group of courts is joined by MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, a
second major treatise on federal civil procedure. See infra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
121. This interpretation results if only Rule 15(a)(1)(B) is read to apply to the complaint.
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plaint and a second that begins with the defendant's service of a responsive pleading or Rule 12 motion,12 2 or one continuous period that
begins with the service of the complaint and ends twenty-one days
after the defendant's service of a responsive pleading or Rule 12
motion. 123
As a result of these ambiguities, three readings of amended rule
15(a)(1)(A) are possible. A survey of the developing case law confirms that judges actually are applying the amended rule in different
ways, although they are doing so without noting any ambiguity and
without remarking upon the fact that different lines of cases are
emerging. Eight months after the adoption of the amended rule,124
most courts have chosen either the first or second interpretation, with
cases almost equally split between the two.125 Despite this, the third
possible interpretation best addresses the Advisory Committee's concerns and offers the most sensible procedural solution.
A.

The First Interpretation: A Completely Literal Reading of the
Amended Rule

The most literal reading of amended Rule 15(a)(1) allows the plaintiff to use either subsection (A) or (B) to amend the complaint once as
a matter of course. This interpretation views Rule 15(a)(1) as setting
up two possible periods for amending the complaint as a matter of
course. First, the plaintiff has the right to file an amended complaint
within "21 days after serving [the original complaint]."1 26 Second, the
plaintiff has the right to file an amended complaint for an additional
twenty-one day period that begins with "service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f),
whichever is earlier." 127
This reading is found in approximately half of the reported decisions dealing with the amended rule,'128 as well as in Wright & Miller
on FederalPractice and Procedure,'2 9 one of the most respected trea122. This is possible if Rule 15(a)(1)(A) is read to apply to the complaint. As explained in
parts II.A. and C., the next question is whether to follow the literal language of the rule and let
this twenty-one day period expire to be followed by a second twenty-one day window for amendment that begins with the defendant's service of a responsive pleading or Rule 12 motion.
123. See discussion infra Part II. C.
124. The case law discussed in part II was surveyed in July of 2010.
125. See infra notes Part II. A-B.
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A).
127. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B).
128. See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
129. 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE, & RICHARD L.

MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1480-83 (3d ed. 2010). But see 3 MOORE ET
AL., supra note 3,§ 15.12[3] (3d ed. 2010), discussed infra at notes 153-56 and accompanying text
(adopting a second interpretation of amended Rule 15(a)(1)).
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tises on federal civil procedure. Wright & Miller presently offers the
following interpretation of the 2009 amendment.
The right to amend is no longer terminated by the service of a responsive pleading. Instead, Rule 15(a)(1)(A) extends the right to amend as
a matter of course to within 21 days after serving a pleading or within
one of the periods in Rule 15(a)(1)(B), whichever is earlier. 13 0
Decisions that follow this interpretation can be spotted because they
also allow the plaintiff to use either Rule 15(a)(1)(A) or (B) to amend
the complaint.13 1 In some of these decisions, the facts do not compel
the judge to apply Rule 15(a)(1)(A), and the judge simply quotes
amended Rule 15(a)(1) in a way that includes both subsections (A)
and (B) when referring to amendments to complaints. 1 32 However, in
other decisions, the court explicitly recognizes that the plaintiff has
the "right to one amendment as of right under Rule 15(a)(1)(A)."13 3
The most interesting of these decisions read Rule 15(a)(1) as allowing two discrete twenty-one day periods for amending the complaint as of right, and then go a step further and recognize that this
construction of the amended rule may result in a gap between the two
periods during which amendment as of right will not be possible.134
This unexplained lapse in the plaintiff's right to amend serves no apparent purpose and is not supported by any discussion in the Advisory
Committee's background documents. In the context of such a welldocumented amendment, the simple fact of the Advisory Committee's
silence leads to the implication that the Committee did not intend for
the amendment to have this effect.
130. 6 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 129, § 1483.
131. See infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
132. Ramos v. Aurora Loan Servs., No. 09-61938-CIV, 2010 WL 966856 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 15,
2010); Salazar v. Lehman Bros. Bank, No. CV-10-99-PHX-DGC, 2010 WL 1996374 (D. Ariz.
May 14, 2010); Coit v. Sutton Funding LLC, No. CV-10-0436-PHX-DCG, 2010 WL 2105116 (D.
Ariz. May 24, 2010); Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Syntellect, Inc., No. 2:08cv955-MHT, 2010
WL 2403072 (M.D. Ala. June 14, 2010); Alvarez v. Cnty. of Maricopa, No. CV-10-310-PHXDGC, 2010 WL 2594315 (D. Ariz. June 23, 2010); Pohl v. E.P.A., No. 09-1480, 2010 WL 2607476
(W.D. Pa. June 25, 2010).
133. Prakash v. Atladis U.S.A., Inc., No. 5:10CV33, 2010 WL 2653419 at *2 (N.D. Ohio July
2, 2010). Accord Braninburg v. Coalinga State Hosp., No. CV 1-08-1457-MHM, 2010 WL 711888
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2010); Nattah v. Bush, 605 F.3d 1052, 1056 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Ferris Plaza,
Ltd. v. Peerless Indem. Ins. Co., No. 3:10-CV-633-L, 2010 WL 2540826 at *2, n.1 (N.D. Tex. June
22, 2010) ("Even if Rule 15(a)(1) were to apply, Plaintiff did not amend within twenty-one days
of service, twenty-one days of Defendants' answer in state court, or twenty-one days of
removal.").
134. Fontenot v. Thiele (In re Thiele), AP No. 09-5080, 2010 WL 1026972 at *9 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. Mar. 17, 2010) ("As provided in Rule 15(a)(1), the Fontenots had 21 days after they filed
their complaint and another 21 days after Thiele filed his motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
in which to file an amended complaint as a matter of course."); Scianna v. Amegy Bank Nat'l
Assoc. (In re Bigler, LP), AP No. 10-03029, 2010 WL 1993807 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 18, 2010);
Gagliardi v. Duran, No. 09-cv-00426-WYD-BNB, 2010 WL 2543555 (D. Colo. May 25, 2010).
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This implication draws strength from the existence of another line
of decisions interpreting amended Rule 15(a)(1) differently. 1 3 5 It is
further bolstered by the fact that at least one leading treatise on federal procedure also reads amended Rule 15(a)(1) very differently.13 6
However, the implication becomes an irrefutable conclusion upon
close examination of the May 6, 2008 Advisory Committee Report,
which reveals that this interpretation of the amended rule was raised
in a public comment on the proposed rule, considered, and specifically
rejected by the Advisory Committee as misguided. 137
Public Comment Number 07-CV-020 submitted by the Jordan
Center for Criminal Justice and Penal Reform reads the proposed
amendment to Rule 15(a)(1) as creating:
[A] gap from 21 days following service to the filing of a responsive
pleading (if permitted) or a Rule 12 motion to dismiss in which an
amended pleading may not be filed as a matter of course . .

..

Under

the current Rule, the party may simply file an amended pleading.
Under the proposed rule, however, the party must either seek leave to
amend pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2) or take the simpler course that is
more burdensome to the respondent of awaiting the responsive pleading or motion to dismiss and then filing the amended pleading to
which respondent must respond or move to dismiss anew.1 38
The Jordan Center's comment, which clearly points out that the
amended Rule 15(a)(1) can be read to create a gap between two discrete amendment periods, drew a written response from the Advisory
Committee.13 9
135. See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text (discussing the analysis of amended Rule
15(a)(1) in MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE).
137. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, U.S. COURTS, (May 6, 2008) http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd
Policies/rules/Reports/CV06-2008.pdf [hereinafter May Report].
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 15 cmt. 07-CV-020 Jordan Center for Criminal Justice and Penal Reform, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/CV%20Comments%202007/07CV-020.pdf. Mark Jordan is a federal prisoner who contends that he is wrongfully incarcerated.
See About Mark Jordan, JORDANLITIGATION.COM, http://www.jordanlitigation.com/about-markjordan.php (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). It is possible that Jordan's status as a federal prisoner
caused the Advisory Committee to discount the seriousness of his comment; however, it is noteworthy that thirteen judicial decisions have reached the same conclusion as Jordan.
139. Under the federal rulemaking process, Advisory Committees publish proposed rule
amendments and Advisory Committee notes and solicit comments from the public. Cf. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2073(c)(1) (1994). ("Each meeting for the transaction of business under this chapter by any
committee appointed under this section shall be open to the public . . ."). "All interested individuals and organizations are provided an opportunity to comment on proposed rules amendments and to recommend alternative proposals. The comments received from this extensive and
thorough public examination are studied very carefully by the committees and generally improve
the amendments. The committees actively encourage the submission of comments, both positive
and negative, to ensure that proposed amendments have been considered by a broad segment of
the bench and bar." James C. Duff, A Summary for the Bench and Bar, The Federal Rules of
Practice and Procedure, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, U.S. COURTS, (Oct. 2010),
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The Advisory Committee's response is published in the May 6, 2008
Committee Report, which contains the final texts of the amended rule
and proposed Committee Note, a summary of all public comments
received on the proposed amendment, and the Committee's response
to all substantive comments.' 40 In addressing the Jordan Center's
comment, the Committee Report notes that the comment reads the
proposed amendment to Rule 15(a)(1) as having the potential to create a gap between two separate amendment periods. 41 The Advisory
Committee dismissed this understanding of the amendment as:
[M]isinterpretingwhat is intended: the comment reads the proposal to

create a gap that suspends and then revives the right to amend once as
a matter of course - the right persists for 21 days after service of the
pleading, disappears, and then reappears for 21 days after service of a
responsive pleading or Rule 12 motion. The question raised by this
suggestion is whether (a)(1)(A) should be revised "(A) if the pleading
is one to which a responsive pleading is not required, 21 days after

serving it, (B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is
required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion .... 142
The Jordan Center's comment placed the Committee on notice that
the language of the proposed amendment could be read to create an
anomalous period during which the plaintiff would have no right to
amend the complaint as a matter of course.14 3
After dismissing this reading of the amendment as a misunderstanding, the Advisory Committee gave it short shrift in the summary response to all of the substantive comments received on the proposed
rule amendment:
Discussion: That Rule 15(a) be recommended for adoption as published. No changes need be made in the Committee Note. The Subcommittee and Committee considered many variations on the right to
amend once as a matter of course and the events that cut it off. The

argument that at least a responsive pleading should immediately terminate the right to amend was advanced vigorously in Standing Committee discussion. No new reasons have been suggested for
reconsidering the recommendation. The suggestion made by the Jor44
dan Center is a matter of style; the rule as published seems clear.1

This discussion makes it plain that the Advisory Committee's focus
was on the events that would terminate the plaintiff's right to amend
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulemakingProcess/Summary
BenchBar.aspx.
140. May Report, supra note 137, at 55-56.
141. See May Report, supra note 137, at 56.
142. May Report, supra note 137, at 56
143. See id.
144. See id. (emphasis added).
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as of course. The Jordan Center's comment, which refocused the lens
to ask which events would begin the plaintiff's right to amend as a
matter of course, was dismissed as mistaken and not reflective of the
Committee's intent.
Despite the Advisory Committee's characterization of Jordan
Center's comment as misguided, thirteen judicial opinions entered between December 1, 2009 and July 31, 2010 have applied the literal
language of the amended rule and misread the meaning of the
amended rule in the same way. 1 45 These decisions apply the plain language of amended Rule 15(a)(1) and recognize that a completely literal reading of the amended rule allows the plaintiff to use either
subsection (A) or (B) to amend the complaint as a matter of course. 14 6
Although these decisions are reading the literal language of the
amended rule correctly, the Advisory Committee's May 6, 2008 Report establishes that this interpretation was not intended by the Advisory Committee.
B.

The Second Interpretation: A Quasi-Literal Interpretation of the
Amended Rule

The second possible interpretation of amended Rule 15(a)(1) finds
that only subsection (B) - and not subsection (A) - applies to plead-

ings, like the complaint, that require a responsive pleading. These decisions effectively highlight the positive phrase "if the pleading is one
to which a responsive pleading is required" 47 in subsection (B), and
draw the negative implication that these pleadings are excluded from
the operation of subsection (A). This reading of the rule "permits
parties to amend 'as a matter of course' a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required within twenty-one days after service of a responsive pleading or the filing of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or
(f).1"148

By July 24, 2010, thirteen judicial decisions had adopted this approach to amended Rule 15(a)(1).149 These decisions can be identified because they assume that only Rule 15(a)(1)(B) can be used to
amend the complaint as a matter of course, and that this rule creates a
twenty-one day period for amendment. 5 o Some of these decisions apply subsection (B) without discussion or in a way that is forced by the
145. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
146. Id.
147. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B).
148. DeWald v. Clinton, No. 05-71492, 2010 WL 778057, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2010).
149. By the same date, another 13 decisions had reached a completely different understanding of amended Rule 15(a)(1). See supra Part II. A.
150. See infra notes 151-52.
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However, another subset of these
procedural posture of the case.'
decisions very clearly holds that the plaintiff is allowed "to amend his
Complaint once as a matter of right, as long as he [does] so within 21
days of service of Defendants' Answer or a motion under Rule 12(b),
(e) or (f)."1 5 2
The plausibility of this approach to amended Rule 15(a)(1) is
53
as well
demonstrated by its adoption in Moore's Federal Practice,1
as, by several of the public comments on the proposed amendment,
which assume this meaning for the new rule. Moore's explains that
"there is, in fact, only one, single 21-day period available for amending [complaints] 'as a matter of course. '154 The earliest served responsive pleading or motion starts that single period running."'"' This
reading of the rule echoes several public comments, typified by the
comment submitted by the Department of Justice, noting that "under
this proposal, a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required
(such as a complaint or a cross- or counter-claim) can be amended
once as a matter of course 21 days after service of a responsive pleading, or 21 days after service
of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f),
156

whichever is earlier.'

151. Hamilton v. Bogardus (In re Crawford), AP No. 09-7084, 2010 WL 908482 (Bankr. D.
Kan. Mar. 10, 2010); Martinez v. America's Wholesale Lender, No. C 09-05630 WHA, 2010 WL
934617 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2010); Ponton v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the E.D. of Pa., No. 10-1514 (JBS),
2010 WL 2010885 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 2010); Midthassel v. Aramark Corp., No. 09-05515 (FLW),
2010 WL 2521977 (D.N.J. June 15, 2010).
152. Jackson v. Municipality of Selma, No. 10-00168-B, 2010 WL 2104591 at *1 (S.D. Ala.
May 3, 2010); accord Dewald, 2010 WL 778057; Wright v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., No. C 0905960 WHA, 2010 WL 1032634 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2010); Mills v. Caruso, No. 1:09-cv-249, 2010
WL 1254576 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 26,2010); Knox v. Rhodes, No. 08-cv-277-JPG, 2010 WL 1444875
(S.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2010); Rezentes v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 10-00054 SOM/KSC, 2010 WL
1905011 (D. Haw. May 10, 2010); Foresight Prods., LLC v. Bond Mfg. Co., No. 09-cv-02629CMA-BNB, 2010 WL 1904522 (D. Colo. May 11, 2010); Pierce v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., No.
10-507, 2010 WL 2080030 (W.D. Pa. May 24, 2010); Martinelli v. Morrow, No. 3:09cv256/MCRI
MD, 2010 WL 2278152 (N.D. Fla. June 3, 2010).
153. 3 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 15.12[3].
154. Id.
155. Id. See also id. (citing Rule 15(a)(1)(B) to support the statement that "[a] party may
amend its pleading, if it is 'one to which a responsive pleading is required,' either: within 21 days
after service of a responsive pleading, or within 21 days after service of a motion under Rule
12(b), (e), or (f).").
156. Letter from Jeffrey S. Bucholtz, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to Peter G. McCabe, Secretary of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Feb. 15, 2008) (on file
with author), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/CV%20
Comments%202007/07-CV-015.pdf (emphasis added). The proposed rule was given a similar interpretation in comments submitted by attorney Robert M. Steptoe, Jr., and Professor Bradley
Scott Shannon. See Letter from Robert M. Steptoe, Jr., to Peter G. McCabe, Secretary of the
available at
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Feb. 12, 2008) (on file with author),
2 2007 7
/0 -CVhttp://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/CV%20Comments% 0
011.pdf; Email from Professor Bradley Scott Shannon to Secretary McCabe (Feb. 14, 2008) (on
file with author), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/CV%20
Comments%202207/07-CV-012.pdf.
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This reading of the amended rule applies Rule 15(a)(1)(B) literally
and ignores other aspects of the text that, taken equally literally, make
subsection (A) also applicable to complaints and other pleadings that
state claims.' 57 This analysis of the rule enforces the two primary purposes of the amendment to Rule 15(a)(1) by limiting the plaintiff's
time to amend and by giving equivalent treatment to responsive
It also reflects the intent of the
pleadings and Rule 12 motions.'
Advisory Committee more accurately than the first, most literal, interpretation of the amended rule.
Despite these advantages, this interpretation has several drawbacks
that will appear in actual practice. First, it limits the plaintiff's period
for amendments as of course to a mere twenty-one days.159 Second,
and more importantly, it allows the defendant - and not the plaintiff to control when this period will occur in the case. 1 60 This gives a small
procedural advantage to the defendant that is not justified by any corresponding policy goal. Finally, because this interpretation delays the
plaintiff's right to amend until the defendant's service of a responsive
pleading or motion, this reading of the rule makes it impossible for the
plaintiff to file an early and unprompted amendment as of course to
correct obvious defects with the complaint.1 6 ' This undermines the
policy of efficiency that underlies amended Rule 15(a)(1) by forcing
the plaintiff to defer an amendment that could be made earlier.
Of course, the plaintiff remains free to seek leave to amend and,
practically speaking, it is unlikely that a court would deny leave to
amend under Rule 15(a)(2) on a motion filed so early in the case.' 62
Nevertheless, Rule 15(a)(2) motions, even when routine and easily resolved, still require some level of judicial time and attention.
Amended pleadings filed as a matter of course under Rule 15(a)(1) do
not require the judge's involvement, and thus promote judicial economy by simply allowing easy amendments without judicial supervision
in very early stages of litigation.16 3 As a result, it is both reasonable
157. See supra Part II.A.
158. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
159. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B).
160. This interpretation ties the beginning of the plaintiff's right to amend to the defendant's
service of a responsive pleading or Rule 12 motion. By definition, this will occur at a time
chosen by the defendant, who will typically obtain several extensions of time before otherwise
appearing in the case. See Id.
161. For example, if the defendant defaults and simply does not appear, this interpretation of
Rule 15(a) deprives the plaintiff of the ability to amend as a matter of course to correct technical
problems with her complaint.
162. See Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, supra note 84, at 10. ("[E]xperience
seems to be that leave will be granted if there is any plausible prospect that a potentially sustainable claim or defense lies under an inept pleading.").
163. See supra notes 79-80.
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and advantageous to allow amendments as a matter of course before
the defendant's appearance in the case.
The second interpretation's inexplicable failure to allow this desirable result, standing alone, is irrational. When considered in combination with the other drawbacks of this reading of the rule, however, it
becomes part of a larger pattern of awkward procedural effects.
These intrinsic flaws make it unlikely that the second interpretation
reflects the Advisory Committee's true intent.
C.

The Third Interpretation:A Continuous Period for Amending
Complaints that Begins when the Complaint is Filed

The weaknesses inherent in the first and second interpretations can
be cured by reading amended Rule 15(a)(1) so that: (1) only Rule
15(a)(1)(B) applies to amendments to pleadings that require responsive pleadings, and (2) the twenty-one day periods referenced in subsection (B) are viewed as terminating, but not otherwise limiting, the
right to amend as of course. This approach enforces the policies behind the amendment, protects judicial economy, and avoids pointless
procedural gaps. Unfortunately, the literal language of the amended
rule does not clearly produce this result, making it necessary to look
for a less natural reading of the rule that better reflects the Advisory
Committee's intentions. 164
The first necessary point, finding Rule 15(a)(1)(A) inapplicable to
pleadings that state claims, can be reached by focusing on the fact that
subsection (B) applies only "if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required." 65 Technically, this language excludes certain other pleadings from the operation of subsection (B); however, it
is equally possible to draw the negative implication that it also has a
limiting effect. 1 6 6 Read in this way, Rule 15(a)(1)(B) becomes the
only part of the rule that applies to pleadings that state claims, and
hence is the sole provision allowing amendments as a matter of course
to such pleadings. Although not the most obvious reading of the rule,
this interpretation is plausible and achieves a more desirable result
than other alternatives.
164. When, as here, the language of a Rule or statute is clearly ambiguous, the best construction will typically be one that reflects the drafter's intent. See, e.g., Iraola & CIA, S.A. v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 232 F.3d 854, 857 (11th Cir. 2000).
165. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B).
166. See supra notes 140-42.
167. This adjustment to the rule is necessary only to avoid the nonsensical gap that results if
both (A) and (B) apply and an extension of the time to respond is allowed to the defendant. See
supra note 129-30 and accompanying text. If no extension of time is obtained, the 21 day periods
in (A) and (B) will dovetail perfectly and no gap will appear.
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The second necessary point is to view the twenty-one day periods
given in Rule 15(a)(1)(B) as terminating, but not otherwise limiting,
the time for amendments as a matter of course. This allows the period
for amendment to begin when the pleading is filed or served.168 This
result can be reached by tying the word "within" that precedes subsections (A) and (B) to the events stated in subsection (B) to create a set
of termination dates. 16 9 In this way, Rule 15(a)(1)(B) can be read as
establishing a termination date that will always be twenty-one days
after the occurrence of a certain event, but not as limiting the period
for amendment to a mere twenty-one days. This is exactly how the
rule has historically operated; however, the Committee's choice of the
word "within," which was added by the 2009 amendment, allows the
rule to be read in a more limited way. 17 0
This interpretation of the rule was assumed in Montz v. Pilgrim
Films & Television, Inc., one of the first circuit court decisions to discuss the 2009 amendment to Rule 15(a)(1)."' In Montz, Judge
O'Scannlain writes of the applicability of the amendment to a pending
complaint:
Amendments to Rule 15(a) took effect on December 1, 2009, and apply to pending proceedings 'insofar as just and practicable.' Rule
15(a), as amended, provides that a party's right to amend as a matter
of course terminates '21 days after service of a responsive pleading or
21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.' Thus, under the amended rule, the plaintiffs' right to
amend as a matter of course terminated in May 2007, before the district court's ruling on the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion.172
The judge's addition of the word "terminates" immediately before the
quotation from the rule indicates that he does not read the rule as
limiting the plaintiff to one twenty-one day period in every case.173
Instead, he reads the amended rule as creating a period that ends on
the specified date.' 74 This usage implies a continuous time-period that
ends twenty-one days after one of the events specified in Rule
15(a)(1)(B), but begins at some earlier point.
168. Before the 2009 amendment, Rule 15(a) did not distinguish between these two events,
allowing an amendment as a matter of course "at any time" before a responsive pleading was
served. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (2009) (amended 2009). Thus, it was possible to amend a complaint
once as a matter of course immediately after filing it.
169. These events are, of course, the service of the earlier of a responsive pleading or a
motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f).
170. As noted previously, a number of courts, as well as one major treatise, are reading the
rule in exactly this way. See supra Part II.B.
171. Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc., 606 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2010).
172. Id. at 1159 n.1 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
173. Id.
174. Id.
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The background material to the 2009 amendment makes it clear
that the Advisory Committee was also focused on the cutoff point for
amendments as of right to pleadings that state a claim.s Nothing in
these materials indicates any intention to change the point at which
the right begins. To the contrary, the Committee's gaze was on two
goals located at the termination point. The first goal allows responsive pleadings and Rule 12 motions to have equal weight in terminating the plaintiff's right.1 76 The second goal tightens the time for
amendments to a relatively brief period after the defendant's appearance through a responsive pleading or Rule 12 motion. 17 7 These goals
are completely fulfilled by allowing amended Rule 15(a)(1)(B) to control the termination of the plaintiff's right to amend, and nothing is
gained by reading subsection (B) as also controlling the start date and
limiting the period to a scant twenty-one days. Similarly, nothing in
the Advisory Committee materials indicates any intention to create
the possible gap created by the first interpretation of the amended
rule. In fact, the Committee itself has characterized this reading as a
misunderstanding of the amendment. 178
Given this, the Committee's intention appears to have been to use
amended Rule 15(a)(1)(B) to create a continuous period for amendments as of right to pleadings that state a claim. This period would, as
before, begin with the filing of the pleading, but would now predictably terminate twenty-one days after the service of a responsive
pleading or motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f). Unfortunately, the
amended text does not lead to this outcome, with the result that the
initial discussions of amended Rule 15(a)(1) in treatises and case law
fragment into two camps - neither of which corresponds to the most
logical construction of the rule. 17 9
III.

CONCLUSION: THE THIRD INTERPRETATION PROVIDES THE
BEST OUTCOME

Because amended Rule 15(a)(1) is inherently ambiguous, three interpretations of amended Rule 15(a)(1) are possible and courts will be
forced to select between them. This choice should be made thoughtfully because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give amendments a
central role that is closely tied to the function of pleading itself. As
pleading itself becomes more difficult, the ability of parties to easily
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See
See
See
See
See

supra Part I. C.
supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
supra Parts II. A.-B.
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amend their pleadings becomes correspondingly more important.1 80
Despite this, developing case law under the amended rule reflects a
problematic and unwitting split between two plausible readings of the
amended rule - both of which have colorable support in the text - and
that stands to make amendments less available.
Rule 15(a) historically allowed any pleading stating a claim to be
amended once as a matter of course at any time before the service of a
responsive pleading."s1 This language elegantly excluded answers and
other pleadings that do not compel a responsive pleading, and sensibly
allowed the claimant to amend as of right at any point before the end
of the given period.' 8 2 The prior language did not specify a beginning
date for the plaintiff's right to amend as of course for the simple reason that there is no policy reason for doing so. The old rule presumed
that the plaintiff would not waste this opportunity by filing an improvident or frivolous early amendment and, thus, concentrated on providing a clear termination point.' 8 3 This rationale is equally true under
the amended rule and is reflected in the stated goals of the 2009
amendment - providing equivalent treatment to responsive pleadings
and Rule 12 motions and limiting the plaintiff's time to amend in response to each.
The third interpretation does not flow as easily from the text of
amended Rule 15(a)(1) as the first and second possible interpretations
of the rule. However, properly understood, the first and second interpretations have the potential to produce results that are anomalous at
best and nonsensical at their worst. The third interpretation avoids
these flaws, while accomplishing all of the policy goals of the amendment and better reflecting the expressed intent of the Advisory Committee. In addition, the third interpretation of the amended rule
coherently meshes prior procedure with the goals behind the 2009
amendment and, thus is the interpretation that will come most naturally to judges and lawyers familiar with the practice for amending
complaints as a matter of course under prior Rule 15(a)(1).
180. Many commentators report that the Supreme Court's decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. 1937 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), have made pleading
more difficult. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on
the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,60 Duke L.J. 1, 18-36 (2010); Scott Dodson, New Pleading,
New Discovery, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 53, 64-68 (2010).
181. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (2009) (amended 2009) (Answers and other pleadings that do not
compel a responsive pleading were, in turn, expressly addressed in former Rule 15(a)(1)(B)).
182. Id.
183. Minutes: Civil Rules Advisory Committee, May 22-23, 2006, supra note 86, at 24 ("[Al
pleader recognizes the importance of the first amendment. After one amendment, it becomes
more difficult to win permission to make another amendment. 'Taking the first shot will be a
matter for care."').
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The ambiguity in the 2009 amendment to Rule 15(a)(1) will inevitably be resolved, either by a subsequent amendment or by developing a
consensus through case law. The resulting rule should be devised with
due regard for the history of Rule 15, the realities of modern litigation, and the stated purposes of the 2009 amendment. Optimally, this
resolution will allow a continuous period for amending pleadings that
state a claim that begins when the pleading is filed and that continues
for twenty-one days after the service of the earlier of a responsive
pleading or motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f).
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